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WILLIAM J. KOLASKY*
In July 2001, for the first time ever, the European Commission
("Commission") prohibited a merger of two U.S. firms the U.S. an-
titrust agencies had cleared. That decision,' blocking the proposed
merger of General Electric ("GE") with Honeywell International
("Honeywell"), triggered a vigorous debate between U. S. and
European Union ("EU") competition officials not only over the de-
cision, but also over merger policy toward conglomerate mergers
generally.2
Immediately following the decision, Charles James, the newly
appointed Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, issued a press
statement that criticized the Commission's decision, saying it "re-
flect[ed] a significant point of divergence" between the two com-
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International Enforcement, Anti-
trust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. These remarks reflect the Author's per-
sonal views and not necessarily those of the Antitrust Division. This disclaimer is
particularly appropriate in this instance. The Author was not at the JusticdDe-
partment when the Department cleared the GE/Honeywell merger and did not
participate in that decision. Prior to joining the Antitrust Division in September
2001, the Author consulted with Honeywell concerning its merger with GE during
the pendency of the EU proceeding, although he did not represent Honeywell in
this matter before either the Justice Department or the European Commission.
The Author had previously represented AlliedSignal in securing antitrust clear-
ance from both the Justice Department and the European Commission for its
merger with Honeywell in 1999.
1 See Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell v. Commission (2001)
[hereinafter GE/Honeywell] (detailing the provisions of the proposed merger),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index/by
_nr_m_44.htnl#m_2220.
2 A "conglomerate merger" is generally defined by what it is not The term is
used to encompass all mergers that are neither horizontal (between direct com-
petitors) nor vertical (between firms that have a buyer-seller relationship). As
such, it is a broad term that encompasses mergers of complements and weak sub-
stitutes, as well as pure conglomerate mergers in which there is no relationship
between the products of the merging firms.
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petition authorities 3 This divergence prompted the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Antitrust Division ("the Department") to take the
unusual step of issuing a detailed explanation of its decision not to
challenge the merger in a White Paper it submitted to the Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") for
a roundtable on conglomerate mergers in October 2001.4 That
White Paper drew a detailed response from the Commission in a
paper presented by the head of its Merger Task Force at the Ford-
ham Corporate Law Institute later the same month.5 This, in turn,
led the Department to further explain its views through a paper by
this Author presented at a George Mason University School of Law
symposium in November.
6
This Symposium, sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Economic Law ("JIEL"), is the first pro-
gram to take a detailed look at both the GE/Honeywell decision and
the debate it generated. JIEL is to be commended for having or-
ganized this Symposium. The Justice Department welcomes criti-
cal scrutiny of its decisions by the academic community and the
kind of dialog this Symposium is designed to promote. The De-
partment particularly welcomes the opportunity to respond to
some of the issues that have been raised, as to both the substance
and the style of its response to the Commission's decision.
1. INTRODucrION
Two competing views seem to have emerged with respect to
the difference in outcomes in GE/Honeywell between the United
States and Europe. The first, more optimistic view is that this was
3 See John R. Wilke, U.S. Antitrust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger
of GE and Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A3 (noting the arguments made
by Charles James against the EU's decision).
4 See United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division Submission for
OECD Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, (Oct. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter OECD Roundtable] (discussing the "range effects" theory where a
merger is condemned by its suspected outcome effects on competition in the mar-
ket), at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/international/9550.pdf.
5 G6tz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Merg-
ers Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 885 (2002) (discussing lever-
aging effects of conglomerate mergers and providing an analytical assessment of
the GE/Honeywell merger from the Commission's perspective).
6 See William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long
Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv (forthcoming Fall 2002) (com-
paring the fundamental difference in rationale for U.S. and EU challenges to
mergers, specifically addressing the GE/Honeywell merger).
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a one-time aberration, based on different factual findings. Those
holding this view emphasize that this is the first time since the EU
adopted its Merger Regulation in 1991 that one jurisdiction has
blocked a merger involving global markets that the other would
have allowed.7 This statistic may somewhat overstate the extent of
convergence. However, a closer look would show that over this
ten-year period, there have been relatively few merger decisions
involving truly global markets. And while there is only one case
where one authority prohibited a merger involving global markets
over the objection of the other, there are at least two other mergers
involving global markets-Boeing/McDonnell Douglas8 and Al-
lied-Signal/Honeywell 9-in which the European Commission im-
posed conduct relief beyond what the U.S. agencies believed nec-
essary.
The second, more pessimistic hypothesis, is that GE/Honeyzvell
is only the tip of the iceberg. Under this view, the situation is a lit-
tle like that of a homeowner who sees a termite and, when he pulls
up the floorboard, finds that his beams have been nearly eaten
away. Those holding this view fear that there are significant dif-
ferences between the United States and the EU with respect to
abuse of dominance and monopolization and that these differences
may have contributed to the difference in outcomes in
GEIHoneywello For example, under EU law it is an almost per se
abuse of dominance for a dominant firm to grant loyalty discounts
unless they are cost justified." U.S. law, by contrast, allows and
7 See John R. Wilkie, U.S. Antitrust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger
of GE and Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A4 (concluding "companies
[were] sideswiped for the first time").
8 See Commission Decision 97/816 of 30 July 1997, Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L336) 16, CEC (CCH) 2,109 (1998) (declaring a concentration
compatible with the common market and the functioning of the European Eco-
nomic Association ("EEA") Agreement).
9 See Commission Decision 2001/417 of 1 December 1999,
AlliedSignal/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (L 152) 1 [hereinafter AlliedSignal/Honeywell]
(declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the func-
tioning of the EEA Agreement).
10 See William J. Kolasky, North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging
Toward What?, Address before the BIICL Second Annual International and Com-
parative Law Conference (May 17, 2002) (proposing that the U.S. and European
Community work together to close gaps), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public
/speeches/11153.htm.
1 See Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and European Merger Policy-Fault Lines and
Bridges, Mergers That Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEo. MASON L.
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indeed encourages companies to discount, so long as the resulting
prices are not below cost and, even then, will intervene only if
there is a dangerous probability that the discounts may serve to
maintain or acquire monopoly power.12
Which of these two alternative pictures is right? The answer
depends on one's perspective; this is an almost classic case of ask-
ing whether the glass is half empty or half full. One of Secretary of
State Cohn Powell's rules for effective leadership is that
"[o]ptimism is a force multiplier."13 Applying that principle, there
is certainly reason for optimism with respect to the convergence of
U.S. and EU competition policy. Over the last ten years, under the
leadership of Karel Van Miert and Mario Monti, the European
Commission has made enormous progress in integrating modem
economics into EU competition law and policy. This is most evi-
dent in Commissioner Monti's recent statements embracing the
consumer welfare model of competition law and offering assur-
ances that the Commission will not challenge a merger simply be-
cause it makes the merging firm a more efficient, and therefore
stronger, competitor.14 Given this progress, to the extent there may
still 4be differences in how the two jurisdictions apply their law,
there is every reason to believe that over time these differences will
be further reduced, even if they do not disappear altogether.
But for that to happen, the U.S. and EU competition authorities
must continue to work together to promote convergence around
sound competition principles. This requires that they engage each
REV. (forthcoming Fall 2002) (addressing divergences between U.S. and EU law in
the case of mergers).
12 See id. See, e.g., Virgin At. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d
256 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that incentive agreements did not violate the Sherman
Act); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (find-
ing insufficient evidence to hold that engine manufacturer's discount programs
restrained trade), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000).
13 See Todd S. Purdum, Because It's Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at Al
(using one of Secretary of State Colin Powell's management precepts, known as
Powell's Rules, to determine perspective on policy).
14 See Mario Monti, Review of the EC Merger Regulation-Roadmap for the
Reform Project, Speech Before the Conference on Reform of European Merger
Control (June 4, 2002) (clarifying the absence of an "efficiency offence" in EU
merger law), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/index-
speeches_bythe _commissioner.html; Mario Monti, The Future for Competition
Policy in the European Union, Speech at Merchant Taylor's Hall (uly 9, 2001)
(providing answers to key questions concerning issues highlighted in the
GE/Honeywell merger), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ competition/speeches/
index-speeches by thecommuissioner.html
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other in serious substantive discussions in order both to under-
stand the reasons for the existing differences in approach, and to
identify which approach better serves the interests of consumers,
economic growth, and the global economy. Symposia like this one
facilitate the kind of constructive dialog that is needed.
In that spirit, this Article begins with a brief discussion of the
goals of antitrust and of the principles that should guide sound
merger review. The Article then briefly reviews the reasons the
Department did not challenge the GE/Honeywell merger on the
basis of the theories on which the European Commission relied.'5
Finally, the Article responds to some of the questions that have
been raised about the Department's approach by those who advo-
cate or defend the Commission's contrary condusions. Because
this is a Symposium, and because other papers have set the stage
by describing the facts of the GE/Honeywell merger, this paper
will not re-plow that ground.
2. THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST
In a speech in Cape Town, South Africa, I suggested six guid-
ing principles for antitrust review of mergers.16 The six principles
are:
(1) Protect competition, not competitors.
(2) Recognize the central role of efficiencies in antitrust analysis.
(3) Base decisions on sound economics and hard evidence.
(4) Realize that our predictive capabilities are limited.
(5) Impose no unnecessary bureaucratic roadblocks.
15 The Department did find that the merger raised competitive concerns with
respect to horizontal overlaps in the markets for the production of U.S. military
helicopter engines and in the provision of heavy maintenance, repair and over-
haul ("MRO") services for certain Honeywell aircraft engines and auxiliary power
units ("APUs"). The Department reached a settlement with the parties pursuant
to which they would have been required to divest Honeywell's helicopter engine
business and to authorize a new third-part MRO service provider for certain
models of Honeywell aircraft engines and APUs. See Press Release, U.S. Depart-
ment Of Justice Antitrust Division, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001) (explaining the
divestiture requirement conditioned by the Department for the approval of the
merger), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2001/8140.htm.
16 William J. Kolasky, Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding
Principles for Antitrust Agencies-New and Old, Speech before the International
Bar Association Conference on Competition Law and Policy in a Global Context
(March 18, 2002) (detailing six guiding principles for antitrust agencies), at
http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.htm.
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(6) Be flexible and forward-looking.
The divergent outcomes in GE/Honeywell implicate the first four of
these principles.
2.1. Protect Competition, Not Competitors
While some may call this a slogan, it is the central axiom of
modem American antitrust doctrine.17 It is also an axiom that has
real meaning. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Rebel Oil v. Atlan-
tic Richfield:
Competition consists of rivalry among competitors.... Of
course, conduct that eliminates rivals reduces competition.
But reduction of competition does not invoke the Sherman
Act until it harms consumer welfare.... Accordingly, an
act is deemed anti-competitive under the Sherman Act only
when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the
prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their
quality.18
What this principle means, in short, is that the antitrust laws
should not seek to protect individual competitors, but should in-
stead seek to protect the competitive process and thereby consum-
ers.19
2.2. Recognize the Central Role of Efficiencies
This principle is a corollary of the first. As former Treasury
Secretary Lawrence Summers reminded the American Bar Asso-
ciation Section of Antitrust Law shortly after leaving office, "[T]he
goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal is that there
be efficiency." 20 The point Secretary Summers was making is that
17 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89
(1977) (holding that mergers should be condemned only when they have anti-
competitive effects).
18 Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing one of several common law principles that aid courts in distinguishing
between exclusionary acts and competitive acts).
19 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
that exclusionary practices harm the "competitive process" and thus consumers).
20 Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, Address
Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, in 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 353,358 (2001).
[23:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss3/3
2002] CONTINUING THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOG 519
the principal reason economists value competition is because it
promotes both allocative and productive efficiency.21 Therefore, as
the Department's Director of Economics put it recently, "efficiency
is the goal, competition is the process." 22 These first two principles
are closely linked, because the more agencies try to protect com-
petitors, the more they are likely to harm competition and there-
fore efficiency.
2.3. Base Decisions on Hard Evidence and Sound Economics
One of the leading U.S. antitrust cases that helped to move the
U.S. antitrust law out of what Judge Douglas Ginsburg calls the
dark ages and into the modem era was the BM case in 1979, in
which the Supreme Court wrote, "easy labels do not always supply
ready answers."23 Too much of the discussion of GE/Honeywell has
fallen back on labels such as mixed bundling, technical tying, lev-
eraging, vertical foreclosure, and "tool kits of dominance." One of
the things the United States has learned over the last quarter cen-
tury is that labels should not be used to decide antitrust cases.
Antitrust decisions should be based, instead, on a dose examina-
tion of the hard facts, applying what Joseph Schumpeter called
"the cold metal of economic theory" to the arguments made by
both the parties and the complainants.24
2.4. Realize That Our Predictive Capabilities Are Limited
Merger analysis is necessarily forward-looking-it requires
that a court or agency make the best prediction it can as to the
likely effects of a yet-to-be-consummated merger. Because no one
can foretell the future perfectly, enforcement decisions must bal-
ance the harm that may be caused by allowing a merger that turns
out to be anti-competitive (what statisticians call a "false negative,"
21 See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, Address
at the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines (June 10, 2002) (supporting
the assertion that the fundamental reasons competition is favored over monopoly
are allocative and productive efficiency), at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr
/hmerger.htm.
22 See id. at n.4 (citing a quote by Kenneth Heyer in his address before the
Merger Task Force of the European Commission's Directorate General for Com-
petition).
23 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
24 JOsEPH A. SCHuMPErER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 87-106
(Harper & Row 1976) (1942).
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or type two error) against the harm that may be caused by blocking
a merger that turns out to be efficiency-enhancing and thus pro-
competitive (a "false positive," or type one error).25 In so doing, it
is particularly important not to give up likely near-term benefits
for more speculative long-term harms.
3. THE GE/HONEYWELL DECISION
Turning to the GE/Honeywell case, there were six key issues on
which the United States and EU disagreed that were central to
their divergent outcomes. These were: (1) Was GE dominant in
large jet engines? (2) Would bundling be a successful exclusionary
strategy? (3) Would GE's financial strength give Honeywell a deci-
sive advantage? (4) Could GE Capital Activation Series
("GECAS") be used to foreclose avionics rivals? (5) Were rivals
likely to exit? And, finally, the ultimate question: (6) Would the
harm outweigh the benefits?26
3.1. Was GE Dominant in Large Commercial Aircraft Engines?
The central premise of the complainants' and of the European
Commission's decision was that GE was already dominant in the
market for large commercial aircraft engines. The Commission
found that the merger would both strengthen GE's dominant posi-
tion in that market and allow GE to extend its dominant position to
the markets for avionics and non-avionics systems in which Hon-
eywell competed.27 The Justice Department concluded to the con-
trary, that the market for large commercial aircraft engines was a
bid market, characterized by large sophisticated buyers, in which
GE faced substantial competition from two strong rivals and that
GE could not, therefore, act independently of its competitors or
customers, which is the prerequisite for a finding of dominance.28
25 See C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Anti-
trust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999) (arguing that a balance must be reached
and information on market power be used to determine competitiveness).
26 The description in this section of the conclusions the Justice Department
reached in reviewing the GE/Honeywell merger is based on the Department's
OECD White Paper, see OECD Roundtable, supra note 4. See also Kolasky, supra
note 6.
27 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 350-55.
28 See Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Commission., 1979 E.C.R. 461 (explaining
"dominant position").
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The Commission's finding of dominance rested principally on
its view that GE had a sixty-five percent share of the relevant mar-
ket, as measured by outstanding orders for engines on large com-
mercial aircraft currently in production. The Justice Department
believed this method of measuring market share overstated GE's
market position. GE derived one-third of its share of outstanding
orders from a single sole-source contract to supply engines for the
Boeing 737 through CFM, its joint venture with Snecma. Excluding
this one contract, the shares of the three rival engine manufacturers
would be much more evenly balanced and would resemble the
distribution of contract awards for the first several months of 2001,
during which GE won forty-two percent of the orders, Pratt &
Whitney thirty-two percent, and Rolls Royce twenty-seven per-
cent.29 This led the Department to conclude that GE would not be
in a position to exercise market power and therefore did not have a
dominant position in this market.
Market shares aside, the performance of the market for large
commercial aircraft engines further contradicted the claim that GE
was already dominant. Customers described competition among
the three rivals as fierce, a description that was confirmed by the
deep and growing discounts that characterized recent engine sales.
Just as in the classic example of razors and razor blades, large
commercial aircraft engine manufacturers generally sold engines at
a loss expecting to recoup that loss through the sale of spares and
repairs. Far from losing ground to GE, GE's rivals, Pratt & Whit-
ney and Rolls Royce, both enjoyed growing revenues and profits
and both were investing heavily in R&D. The results of recent en-
gine competitions confirmed that Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce
continued to be able to compete effectively and were not being
dominated by GE. For example, the Pratt & Whitney/Rolls Royce
joint venture, IAE, claims to have won seventy-two percent of or-
ders on the advanced A320 family in 2001, in direct competition
with the GE/Snecma joint venture, CFM.
30
29 See Kolasky, supra note 6.
30 See Press Release International Aero Engines, IAE's V2500 Is the Power-
plant of Choice for A320 Family Aircraft, Half of IAE's Largest Customers Come
from Asia (Feb. 26, 2002) (breaking down market share for the A320), at
http://www.intemationalaeroengines.com/news/2002/02-26-0
2b.shtmn.
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3.2. Was Bundling Likely to Be a Successful Exclusionary Strategy?
One of the main concerns GE's rivals voiced during the merger
review was that the merger would facilitate what they called
"mixed bundling" - that is, selling a bundle of components, engine
and avionics in this case, at a price lower than the total price of the
components purchased separately.31 In a paper submitted for this
Symposium, a Commission officially claims that this concern did
not feature prominently in the Commission's decision to prohibit
the GE/Honeywell merger, notwithstanding that the final decision
devoted several pages to the issue.32 If true, this statement would
raise a serious question as to what basis the Commission had for
finding that the merger would strengthen GE's dominant position
in engines. The Commission's other theories of competitive harm,
based on GE's so-called "toolkit of dominance," could not have
provided that basis because GE already enjoyed those advantages
in the market for large commercial aircraft engines and there was
never any suggestion that Honeywell would add any new tools,
other than the ability to bundle.33
It is not surprising, however, that the Commission's spokesper-
sons have tried to downplay the Commission's reliance on mixed
bundling. The Commission's Statement of Objections relied on an
economic model developed by an economics professor at Michigan
State University, Jay Pil Choi, to support its original theory of
mixed bundling. That model purported to show that the merger
would produce a strong Coumot effect.34 Professor Choi based his
model on prior work by Barry Nalebuff, a professor of economics
at Yale. Testifying for the parties, Professor Nalebuff showed that
31 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 350-55.
32 See Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: a Theoretical Bundle Assessing Conglom-
erate Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 473-74 (2002) (suggest-
ing the Commission based its case most strongly on the anticipation of the fore-
closure of GE/Honeywell rivals from the markets).
33 The Commission did find that Honeywell was the only non-vertically inte-
grated manufacturer of starters for large commercial aircraft engines and that its
acquisition by GE would give rise to vertical foreclosure concerns, but this vertical
overlap was a distinct concern and would have been readily remediable through a
relatively minor divestiture. GE/Honeywell supra note 1, paras. 302-29.
34 See Giotakos supra note 32, at 498-99 (explaining that a Cournot effect pos-
its that a company that produces a number of complements will have an incentive
to offer them at a lower price closer to marginal cost than would two firms pro-
ducing those same complements individually because the firm will internalize the
externalities (i.e., reduced demand) associated with high prices).
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Choi's model did not fit a market, like aircraft engines and avion-
ics, with differentiated products, powerful buyers, and large trans-
actions that were individually negotiated.35 In the face of Professor
Nalebuff's critique, the Commission eschewed any reliance on the
Choi model in its final decision and has since said that it found the
Cournot effects to have been quite small.
36
3.3. Would GE's Financial Strength Give Honeyzvell a Decisive
Advantage?
Having largely disavowed the mixed bundling theory, spokes-
persons for the Commission maintain that the Commission's real
concern was that GE would use what they termed its "toolkit of
dominance" to drive both its and Honeywell's rivals from the mar-
ket.37 This "toolkit of dominance" appears to have two elements,
the first being GE's financial strength. The theory is that GE's fi-
nancial strength would allow GE to take more risk in product de-
velopment and offer customers discounts and other terms that its
rivals would not be able to match, thus ultimately driving them
from the market.
This argument is highly reminiscent of the "big is bad" argu-
ments that had currency in the United States twenty-five or
thirty years ago, but that have long since been discarded. The
problem with the argument is that it makes no sense absent capital
market imperfections, which were not shown in this case. And, if
one assumes capital market imperfections, then applying GE's
lower capital cost to a broader range of products would be effi-
ciency-enhancing, in which case the theory seeks to protect com-
petitors at the expense of consumers.
35 See Barry Nalebuff & Shihua Lu, A Bundle of Trouble-Bundling and the
GE-Honeywell Merger (October 2001) (manuscript on file with authors) (demon-
strating that bundling has no impact on consumption if prices are negotiated and
there is perfect information).
36 See Giotakos, supra note 32, at 500 (showing that the Cournot effects were
not large enough to overcome the detriment to consumer welfare).
37 See Giotakos, supra note 32, at 484 (suggesting that the merger would
eliminate or marginalize rivals in complementary markets, leading to an eventual
increase in prices and difficulties for competitors re-entering the market).
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3.4. Would GECAS's "Buy GE Only" Policy Lead to Vertical
Foreclosure?
The second, and perhaps more important, weapon in GE's al-
leged "toolkit of dominance" was its aircraft leasing operation,
GECAS. The concern was that extending GECAS's "Buy GE Only"
procurement policy for engines to Honeywell avionics and non-
avionics systems would cause airframe manufacturers to select
those systems, thereby ultimately foreclosing Honeywell's rivals
from the market.38 This theory is analogous to the old reciprocal
dealing theory found in cases, such as Consolidated Foods,39 in the
United States during the 1960s.
In its OECD White Paper, the Justice Department identified
three key problems with this theory of competitive harm.0 First,
GECAS accounted for less than ten percent of total aircraft pur-
chases, a percentage that falls well below the minimum threshold
for vertical foreclosure concerns recognized in the case law.41 Sec-
ond, the argument failed to take account of the counter-strategies
available to GE's engine and leasing rivals, which the Department
concluded would likely fully counteract any procurement bias on
GECAS's part. It did not, therefore, represent a Nash equilib-
rium.42 Third, the theory was counterfactual. GECAS has been
making speculative purchases of aircraft in significant quantities
38 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 350-55.
39 See FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (holding that reciprocal
buying, which protected the market of the acquired company, along with Con-
solidated Food Corporation's reciprocal buying power, obtained through the ac-
quisition, created an anti-competitive obstacle in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act).
40 OECD Roundtable, supra note 4, at 22-23.
41 Generally, vertical foreclosure concerns arise only when the buyers in-
volved represent 30-40 percent of the market for the good or services in question.
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. 72,261, at 82,680
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (granting summary judgment against the government's
exclusive dealing claim).
42 For those unfamiliar with it, the Nash Equilibrium is well explained in the
bar scene in the movie A Beautiful Mind where John Nash is shown conceiving
the Nash Equilibrium, for which he later won the Nobel Prize. Instead of Nash
and his two friends all rushing to the most beautiful girl, their optimal strategy
was to rush the three less attractive girls and leave the beautiful girl alone. The
point is simply that a strategy can represent an equilibrium only if it assumes the
other players will each play their optimal strategy. See A BEAUTnFUL MIND (Uni-
versal Pictures 2001).
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since 1996, and yet GE's share of recent engine contract awards by
leasing companies has fallen, not increased, since then.43
Two economists who submitted economic analyses of the
GE/Honeywell merger on behalf of complainants in both the U.S.
and EU merger review proceedings, Robert Reynolds and Janusz
Ordover, have now published an article attempting to respond to
these criticisms.44 Their article, however, underscores the weak-
nesses in their highly theoretical argument, and the total lack of
any factual basis for their claim that GECAS could tip the market
for avionics and non-avionics systems decisively in Honeywell's
favor.
The central premise of the Reynolds/Ordover argument is that
because airframers' aircraft prices exceed their incremental costs,
even a small shift in aircraft sales resulting from a change in
GECAS's purchasing behavior would produce an effect on air-
framers' margins larger than any price reduction Honeywell's ri-
vals could afford given the need to sustain the R&D investment to
remain in the market.45 Reynolds and Ordover discount the likeli-
hood that Honeywell's rivals would have counteracted this effect
by merging or teaming with rival leasing companies on the ground
that GE's engine rivals had not done so to date.
This Article is not the place to respond in detail to the Rey-
nolds/Ordover defense of their theory, but a few observations are
in order. The first is that the theory rests critically on two strong
assumptions: first, that airframe manufacturers are indifferent as
between the avionics and non-avionics systems embedded in their
aircraft and, second, that aircraft customers are also indifferent
between aircraft. Otherwise, GECAS would lose market share if it
selected an inferior aircraft just because it contained Honeywell
systems, making a threat to do so non-credible. These are similar
to the assumptions on which the Choi model of mixed bundling
was based. As Professor Nalebuff showed, and as the Commission
essentially conceded by discarding the Choi model, those assump-
tions do not fit the aircraft industry, where highly sophisticated
buyers make buying decisions based on very detailed technical
43 See Robert J. Reynolds & Janusz A. Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and the
GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 171, 185 (2002) (arguing that the
GE/Honeywell merger would have harmed competition and consumers).
44 See id. (responding to critics of the EC's decision).
45 See id. at 174-76 (outlining the control premise of the Reynolds/Ordover
argument).
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evaluations of the relative cost and performance of competing sys-
tems and aircraft.46 Yet without these assumptions, the Rey-
nolds/Ordover claim that GECAS's GE-only procurement policy
with respect to engines, which are purchased separately from the
aircraft, could be extended to systems that are embedded in the
aircraft falls apart.
47
The second is that the empirical evidence contradicts the the-
ory. GECAS's GE-only procurement policy has not, in fact, shifted
market shares for engines in GE's direction. To the contrary, GE's
share of engine contract awards by leasing companies fell from
sixty percent for the 1991-1997 period to fifty-one percent for the
more recent 1998-2001 period.48 Examining the data more closely
shows that the reason is, just as one would expect, that rival leas-
ing companies have reduced their purchases of GE engines sub-
stantially in response to GECAS's pro-GE bias. In the 1998-2001
period, GE engines accounted for twenty-eight percent of rival
leasing company purchases, as compared to fifty-three percent in
the earlier period.49
In short, the Reynolds/ Ordover theory that GECAS will some-
how be able to use its sub-ten-percent share of engine purchases as
an "Archimedean lever" to make Honeywell the dominant sup-
46 See generally Nalebuff & Lu, supra note 35 (disputing the applicability of the
Choi model to the aircraft industry). See also GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, at 56
(discussing the exercise of buyer power in the airline industry).
47 Once we relax these assumptions, it is simply not credible that GECAS
would boycott a popular airframe just because one, several, or even most of the
avionics or non-avionics systems were supplied by Honeywell's rivals. For ex-
ample, GECAS could not afford to boycott a popular narrow-body airframe, such
as the B737 or A320, which are the bread and butter of leasing companies and the
bulk of what GECAS purchases, simply because it contains a rival's avionics or
non-avionics systems. (GECAS's GE-only engine procurement policy, by contrast,
does not prevent GECAS from purchasing these aircraft because engines are
buyer-furnished equipment.) The airframe manufacturers are sophisticated and
would know that any threatened GECAS "boycott" was simply not credible.
48 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 71-73.
49 See id. at 24. This, of course, is a complete answer to the Ordo-
ver/Reynolds response to the Department's conclusion that rivals would be able
to counteract GECAS's GE-only buying policy by merging with, or entering into
teaming arrangements with, rival leasing companies. Ordover and Reynolds ar-
gue that since GE's engine rivals have not yet done so it is unlikely Honeywell's
rivals would do so. Since the data show the GECAS's bias has not served to in-
crease GE's market share for engines, and may even have helped reduce it by
causing rival leasing companies on their own initiative to shift purchases away
from GE, it is easy to understand why GE's engine rivals have not found it neces-
sary to merge or team with rival leasing companies.
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plier of avionics and non-avionics systems cannot withstand scru-
tiny. It is fortunate that by publishing their theory, they have ex-
posed its all-too-obvious flaws.
3.5. Would Rivals Have Been Likely to Exit?
Both the mixed bundling and "toolkit of dominance" theories
of competitive harm posit that consumers would be better off in
the short-term, because GE would offer them lower prices than its
rivals, but would suffer in the long-term because GE's rivals would
ultimately be driven from the market, after which GE would be
able to raise prices to a supra-competitive level.50 They depend
importantly, therefore, on a finding that GE and Honeywell's rivals
would not be able to match the attractive terms offered by the
merged firm and would ultimately exit the market.
The Justice Department, unlike the Commission, found these
predictions of ultimate demise difficult to credit. First, both GE's
engine rivals and Honeywell's systems rivals are large, financially
healthy companies with a deep commitment to the aerospace in-
dustry. Second, these markets are characterized by powerful buy-
ers, such as Boeing, Airbus, and the major airlines, all of whom
have a strong incentive to maintain a competitive supply base.
Third, GE and Honeywell's rivals appeared to have effective
counter-strategies available; for example, the industry has a history
of successful teaming arrangements. Indeed, a large part of GE's
market share was due to its CFM joint venture with Snecma.
Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce similarly have joint ventured to
develop a new engine that is winning an increasing share of Airbus
contracts. On the avionics side, the Commission found, in re-
viewing the AlliedSignal/Honeywell merger just two years earlier,
that teaming arrangements were an effective competitive strategy
in these very markets. 51
50 See Reynolds & Ordover, supra note 43, at 174 (defending the Commis-
sion's decision, Reynolds and Ordover introduce for the first time the argument
that the merger might have enabled Honeywell to charge higher prices for its
systems even prior to its rivals exiting the market). This assertion, which even the
Commission appears not to have accepted, is based on their flawed theory of "Ar-
chimedean leveraging." It also fails to take into account the countervailing Cour-
not effect, which would give Honeywell an incentive to decrease, not increase,
prices.
51 See AlliedSignal/Honeywell, supra note 9, para. 118 (noting that commer-
cial teaming has been successful).
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3.6. Would the Harm Outweigh the Benefit?
Fig re A -
Price C P (pre-merger)
Quantity
Whether M > C is function of:
o Size of price cuts o Duration of monopoly
o Duration of competitive round o Probability of rival exit
o Ability to shift purchases 0 Discount rate
o Level of monopoly price
The ultimate question under the complainants' theory of "bene-
fit now, harm later" is whether the harm would outweigh the bene-
fit. The complainants' theory was that, as a result of the merger,
GE/Honeywell would be able to offer better products at lower
prices to its customers, but that consumers would ultimately suffer
because those better prices would drive rivals from the market, af-
ter which the merged firm would gain a monopoly and could raise
prices above pre-merger levels.52 Figure A is a simplified graph
showing both the hypothetical benefits and harms.
As Figure A illustrates, consumers are worse off only if M (the
amount of the overcharges post-exit) is greater than C (the amount
of the savings during the competitive, pre-exit period). That, in
turn, is a function of a large number of variables. These include:
(1) the size of the post-merger/pre-exit price cuts, (2) the probabil-
ity that those benefits will be realized, (3) the duration of the price
cuts-how long it would take to drive the rivals from the market,
(4) the probability that rivals will in fact exit, (5) the ability of cus-
tomers to shift purchases into the competitive period anticipating
higher prices after the rival has exited, (6) the level of the monop-
oly price, (7) the duration of the feared monopoly (which depends
on how long it would take for new entry to occur), and (8) because
the harm occurs later than the benefits-the discount rate. In cal-
culating these variables, it is particularly important to remember
that monopoly prices are not always above competitive prices. If
52 See GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 86 (discussing GE's market domi-
nance and monopoly potential).
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the monopolist is more efficient than a small group of oligopolists,
the monopoly price can be lower than the oligopoly price.53
Given the large number of variables, it is easy to see how diffi-
cult it is to predict with confidence that the harm would outweigh
the benefits. For that reason, an agency or court should be very
cautious before it accepts this kind of a story of "short-term bene-
fit, long-term harm." The short-term benefits are always more
certain than the long-term harms. If the benefits (in the form of ef-
ficiencies, lower prices, etc.) are not realized, there may be no bene-
fit, but there is also no harm. If the efficiencies are realized, the ri-
vals may find ways to respond. (Returning to A Beautiful Mind,
the boys will approach the less attractive girls.) Even if the rivals
do not respond, the customers may behave strategically so as to
preserve competition. (In other words, the less attractive girls may
come over and start talking to the boys.) Even if rivals eventually
exit, the prices charged by the efficient monopolist may be lower
than the prices charged by a small number of less-efficient oli-
gopolists. For these reasons, estimating the probability of exit and
quantifying the benefits of harms discounted to present value will
generally exceed our ability to forecast the future. We need, there-
fore, to quote a character from another movie, Tin Cup, to "be
humble."54
4. RESPONDING TO CRITICS
The other papers presented at this Symposium raise a number
of issues that merit a brief response.
4.1. Sloganeering?
In some of the papers submitted for this Symposium and else-
where, the Justice Department has been accused of engaging in
sloganeering in its criticisms of the Commission's decision in
GE/Honeyzwell, and especially for the suggestion that it reflected an
approach designed more to protect competitors than competition.55
These criticisms get it exactly backwards. The reason the Antitrust
53 This would be particularly true if the oligopolists are playing Cournot,
which is a necessary assumption in order for mixed bundling to have a substantial
impact.
54 TIN CUP (Warner Bros., 1996).
55 See Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not Competitors," nor Canards: Ways of
Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 597 (2002) (analyzing the cri-
tiques of the Commission's decision).
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Division took the unusual step of laying out the reasons for its de-
cision not to challenge the GE/Honeywell merger was to assure
that this dispute would not be reduced to mere sloganeering.
What the Department sought instead was a serious substantive
dialog over the differences in approach between the two jurisdic-
tions. To stimulate such a dialog, the Department recognized that
it would need to take the unusual step of laying out publicly the
reasons for its decision not to challenge a merger that the European
Commission had decided to prohibit. This Symposium, and the
other articles that have appeared debating the merits of the two
agencies' differing approaches to the case, provide an opportunity
for just the kind of dialog the Department had hoped for.
4.2. A False Efficiencies Debate?
Another paper submitted for this Symposium takes issue with
the claim that the European Commission's decision to prohibit the
GE/Honeywell merger was premised on the efficiencies the
merger would have generated.5 6 It maintains that the parties did
not claim any substantial merger-specific cost savings and argues
that the price cuts the Commission feared were therefore not due
to any efficiencies but were simply "strategic" in nature.5 7
This argument takes too narrow a view of efficiency. Its prem-
ise seems to be that the only efficiencies that matter are cost-
savings that serve to reduce the marginal cost of production. But
given that the principal economic argument against monopoly is
that it harms allocative efficiency, it is hard to see how a rational
merger policy could disregard positive effects on allocative effi-
ciency flowing from a merger. Any price cut that moves prices
closer to marginal cost, however motivated, promotes allocative ef-
ficiency. That is, in fact, one of the principal ways in which vertical
integration, whether by merger or internal growth, enhances effi-
ciency-namely, by eliminating what economists call "double-
marginalization."58 The Cournot effect flowing from a merger of
complements is similarly efficiency enhancing-it reduces prices
and increases output by causing the firm to internalize the exter-
nalities imposed by high prices and restrictions of output. Label-
56 Giotakos, supra note 32, at 469.
57 Id. at 476.
58 See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 21.
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ing these price reductions "strategic" adds nothing to the discus-
sion.5 9
Even leaving these non-cost-saving efficiencies aside, it is hard
to square the argument that the parties did not claim any cost sav-
ings with GE's public statements concerning the merger. In his
book, Straight from the Gut, GE's former CEO, Jack Welch, claimed
that GE expected to realize $1.5 billion in cost savings, principally
through the application of best practices, including GE's vaunted
management techniques, to Honeywell's activities. 60 Combining
complementary assets-and good management systems are a very
important complementary asset-is a well recognized source of
merger-specific efficiencies.61 To the extent GE may not have em-
phasized these efficiencies in its dealings with the Commission,
that is hardly surprising given that the theories the Commission
was pursuing seemed to treat efficiencies more as a reason for pro-
hibiting the merger than for approving it.
4.3. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Relief
An argument that is sometimes advanced by those seeking to
defend, or at least explain, the Commission's decision is that it is
harder in Europe than in the United States to obtain ex post relief
against tying and other anti-competitive acts and that it is, there-
fore, more important to intervene ex ante.62 A related argument,
somewhat akin to the evasion of rate regulation theory for chal-
lenging vertical mergers,63 is that the Chicago School critique of
tying-namely that a monopolist cannot increase its monopoly
59 Another important part of the Commission's case was premised on the
competitive advantages GE would derive from extending GE's access to cheap
capital to Honeywell's operations, especially in terms of product development
and being able to offer more favorable terms on initial equipment purchases.
This, again, was an efficiency that would have directly benefited customers.
60 JAcK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 362 (Warner
Books 2001).
61 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizon-
tal Merger Analysis, 68 ANTITRuST L.J. 685 (2001) (evaluating some aspects of the
treatment of efficiencies, including litigated mergers).
62 Giotakos, supra note 32, at 503-04. Even if the premise of this argument
were true, it would leave open the question of why the Commission could not
have relied on the admitted deterrent effect of U.S. law, given that the markets
involved were global.
63 See U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984) § 4.23 (explaining how
monopoly public utilities use non-horizontal mergers to evade rate regulation), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm.
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profit by acquiring a second monopoly over a related good used in
fixed proportions because there is only one monopoly profit to be
earned-has less resonance in Europe because firms in Europe
cannot fully exploit their monopoly power without violating the
prohibition on abuse of dominance. 64 Both arguments miss the
mark.
The first argument suffers from at least three problems. First,
the type of mixed bundling feared in GE/Honeywell- that is, of-
fering a lower price on a bundle of goods than on the goods indi-
vidually-would not have constituted an unlawful tie, at least un-
der U.S. law, even if it had occurred, so long as the prices for the
individual components were not "exorbitant" and the prices for
the bundle were above cost (and there was no claim in
GE/Honeywell that they would not be).65 Second, while a naked
contractual tie is per se unlawful, other types of ties, especially so-
called technological tying, are generally evaluated under the rule
of reason.66 The question then is how an agency is to determine ex
ante that the leveraging practices the merged firm might engage in
would be welfare enhancing or welfare harming. It is hard enough
to determine that after the fact when the tie actually occurs; it
would be nearly impossible to do so when the agency has to guess
at the form the tie will take and at what the structure of the market
will be at that point in time. Third, the law on tying and other
forms of leverage is at least as, if not more, restrictive in Europe
than in the United States.67 It is difficult to understand why the
risk of substantial fines in Europe would have any less deterrent,
effect than the risk of treble damage liability in the United States.
The second argument likewise suffers from at least one funda-
mental flaw. While it is true that exploitative pricing is technically
an abuse of dominance under Article 82, in Europe, exploitative
64 Giotakos, supra note 32, at 501.
65 See ABA SECnON oF ANTITRusr LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 191-93
(5th ed. 2002) (noting that, while courts have allowed packaged discounts, they
have also found them coercive when ordering the goods individually would have
resulted in exorbitant pricing and providing examples of uncoercive pricing).
66 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-97 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that
the "rule of reason," rather than per se analysis, should govern the legality of ty-
ing arrangements involving platform software agreements).
67 See THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 241 Uonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds.,
Oxford University Press 1999) (stating that the test for when a concentration is not
compatible with the common market is "the creation or strengthening of a domi-
nant position as a result of which effective competition would be impeded in the
common market or a substantial part of it").
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pricing cases are very rare.68 The European Commission and na-
tional competition authorities recognize, as do the U.S. courts, that
it would be very difficult to prove that pricing is exploitative with-
out becoming a price regulator, something competition authorities
are ill-equipped to become. The European competition authorities
also recognize, as the U.S. courts and agencies do, that monopoly
prices send an important price signal to the market that invites en-
try and expansion by rivals. This being the case, it is hard to credit
an argument that monopolists are more likely to seek a second
monopoly in Europe than they are in the United States and that
stronger ex ante preventive measures are therefore necessary.
4.4. Did Differences in Substantive Standards Account for the
Different Outcomes?
Some have tried to attribute the different outcomes in
GE/Honeywell to differences in the substantive standard for
merger review in the two jurisdictions. In Europe, the standard is
whether a merger will create or strengthen a dominant position,
whereas, in the United States, the standard is whether the merger
may substantially lessen competition.69 In practice, however, there
is little, if any, difference between these two standards. The U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines define a substantial lessening of
competition as creating or facilitating the exercise of market
power.70 In Europe, a dominant position is defined in terms of
being able to act independently of the firm's competitors and cus-
tomers.71 That definition of dominance is essentially synonymous
with the definition of market power in the United States. The U.S.
"substantial lessening of competition" test, therefore, could be said
to incorporate a dominance test. Conversely, the EU Merger
Regulation requires a finding not only that a merger will create or
strengthen a dominant position, but also that "as a result... effec-
tive competition would be significantly impeded in the common
6 See id. at 190-92 (noting the difficulty in prosecuting excessive pricing).
69 Compare Council Regulation 4064/89 art 2,1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter
Control of Concentrations], modified by Corrigendum to Council Regulation
4064/89,1990 O.J. (L 257) 14, amended by Council Regulation 1310/97,1997 O.J. (L
180) 1, modified by Corrigendum to Council Regulation 1310/97, 1998 O.J. (L 40)
17, art 2(3), with Clayton Act, § 7,15 US.C. § 18 (2000).
70 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comnim'n Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (1992) § 7, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11250.htm.
71 Kolasky, supra note 6.
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part or a substantial part of it."72 The EU dominance test, there-
fore, can be said to incorporate a substantial lessening of competi-
tion test. Since both tests are concerned with preventing the crea-
tion or increase of market power as a result of which competition
will be substantially lessened, it is hard to see why the different
verbal formulations should lead to different outcomes.
4.5. Are the U.S. Agencies Too Skeptical of Competitor Complaints?
Some have suggested that the U.S. antitrust agencies are overly
skeptical of competitor complainants. It is true that the U.S. agen-
cies are deeply skeptical when rivals complain; they believe, as
William Baxter used to teach, that the more competitors complain,
the more likely it is that a merger will be good for consumers. But
the U.S. agencies do not disregard information supplied by com-
petitors, any more than they do information from any other source.
The agencies look at the facts closely and will bring cases based on
rival complaints where there is a sound theory of competitive harm
supported by the facts. Last summer, for example, during the
same month that the Commission prohibited the GE/Honeywell
merger, the Justice Department secured a consent decree partially
blocking a vertical merger of the largest residential door manu-
facturer with the largest supplier of molded doorskins (a key in-
put) based largely on complaints received from downstream com-
petitors.73
4.6. Does the U.S. Take Too Short-Term a View?
Another overly simplistic explanation sometimes offered for
the conflicting decisions is that the Commission is more concerned
about the long-term effects of mergers than the U.S. agencies are,
the implication being that the U.S. agencies are typical --short-
sighted Americans. 74 While it is certainly true that the U.S. agen-
cies are appropriately modest about their ability to predict the fu-
ture generally, and especially the more distant future, it is not true
that the U.S. agencies are not concerned about long-term effects.
One of the reasons, for example, that the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines set the timeframe for entry at two years is. that the
72 Control of Concentrations, supra note 69, art. 2(3).
73 See United States v. Premdor Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 45,326 (Aug. 28, 2001) (pro-
posing final judgment and competitive impact statements).
74 Giotakos, supra note 32, at 499.
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agencies recognize that it would make no sense to expend admin-
istrative resources challenging mergers the negative effects of
which will be only short-term. Similarly, in pharmaceutical merg-
ers, where the product development pipelines are very long, the
agencies will challenge mergers even though the anti-competitive
effects will not be felt for several years. The difference, therefore, is
not long-term versus short-term. The difference, rather, is in the
comparative willingness to trade off likely short-term benefits
against more speculative long-term harms. There, the U.S. agen-
des believe caution is appropriate.
4.Z Does Having to Go to Court Make the U.S. Agencies Too
Cautious?
Another suggestion that is sometimes made is that having to go
to court chills the willingness of the U.S. agencies to bring cases
even where they think anticompetitive harm is likely because of
fear of losing. While it is certainly true that having to go to court
imposes a useful discipline, it is not true that the U.S. agencies are
unwilling to risk losing. Just last fall, the Justice Department chal-
lenged a merger of two companies supplying shared disaster re-
covery computer services, which it lost in District Court because
the court found the Department's alleged market definition too
narrow.7- The Department will bring cases whenever it is con-
vinced a merger is likely to result in a substantial lessening of
competition.
4.8. Were the Different Outcomes a Result of No One Being at Home
in the United States?
The GE/Honeywell merger was reviewed during a period of
transition in the United States from the Clinton to the Bush Ad-
ministration. Some have suggested that this contributed to the di-
vergent outcomes because there were no senior officials in place in
the United States to whom the Commission leaders could talk.
This is simply untrue. One of the first things the newly appointed
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Litigation did after ar-
riving in office was to fly to Brussels to meet with senior Commis-
sion officials, and once the new Assistant Attorney General was in
7- United States v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001)
(declaring the government's definition of the product market overly-narrow and
static).
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office, he had several telephone consultations with his counterparts
in Europe. Both sides knew they were reaching divergent out-
comes and discussed the merits of the issues. That said, it is cer-
tainly desirable in future cases that there be more direct contact
between senior officials at both agencies at earlier stages of investi-
gations than generally has been the case in the past. The U.S. anti-
trust agencies and the Commission are currently working to de-
velop better practices for coordinating their merger reviews that
will provide for more frequent direct contact from the very outset
of an investigation.
4.9. Is the U.S. Approach Too Darwinian?
The final criticism that is sometimes voiced is that the U.S. ap-
proach is too Darwinian, the argument being that we need to be
protective of competitors because without competitors, there can
be no competition.76 The U.S. view is that it is very risky for anti-
trust agencies and courts to try to manage the competitive process.
As Franklin Roosevelt's Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
Thurman Arnold, put it seventy-five years ago: "The economic
philosophy behind the antitrust laws is a tough philosophy.
[Those] laws recognize that competition means someone may have
to go bankrupt. They do not contemplate a game in which every-
one who plays can win."77 Indeed, it is the fear of failure, as much
as the hope of success, that stimulates firms to innovate and be-
come more efficient.
5. CONCLUSION
This article has already made references to several movies but
one more is in order. In Jerry Maguire, the character played by
Cuba Gooding, Jr. repeatedly says, "Show me the morley."78 This
is an appropriate challenge to issue to those who would have com-
petition agencies challenge conglomerate mergers on the basis of
the types of theories advanced in GE/Honeywell. They should be
asked to identify even one merger that benefited consumers in the
short-term with better products and lower prices but that led to the
76 Giotakos, supra note 32.
77 Quoted by Jack Brooks, Remarks at Symposium: In Commemoration of the
60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Antitrust Division Gan. 10, 1994)
(quoting 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 839 (1994)).
78 JERRY MAGUIRE (TriStar Pictures 1996).
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exit of rivals and then left the economy worse off. There may be
such mergers, but to date no one has identified one.
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